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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Trial Court No.

984402025

Appellate Case No.

20001104-C A

Priority Classification

15

KENNETH M. HALL,
Appellant,
v.
DEBORA HALL,
Appellee.
Appeal from a ruling of the Honorable Guy R. Burningham
Judge of the Third District Court

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant submits the following as his Brief herein:

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment entered herein is vested in the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a decree of divorce and supporting findings of fact and
conclusions of law dated February 7, 2000, and the amended findings of fact, conclusions
of law and amended decree of divorce entered on November 17, 2000.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case are:
1. Did the Appellant agree that the forty acres of undeveloped land would not be part
of the marital estate? The standard of review relative to this issue is the clearly erroneous
standard see Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257,259 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Richie v. Richie,
784 P.2d 465,467 (Utah App. 1989)).
2. Did the property awarded to Appellee in her previous marriage become a marital
asset during her marriage to Appellant? The standard of review applicable to this issue is the
abuse of discretion standard. See Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App.
1992).
3. Was the property award to the Appellant equitable? The standard of review
relative to this issue is the abuse of discretion standard. See Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d
818, 820 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982)).
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1) (1953, as amended)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an amended decree of divorce entered on November 17,
2000. A bench trial was held on November 24, 1999, at the conclusion of which the court
took the matter under advisement. A memorandum decision was handed down on
December 20, 1999. On January 3, 2000, the Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
of the memorandum decision which was denied by the court on February 7, 2000.
Following the preparation of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the filing of
objections thereto by the Appellant, a decree of divorce and supporting findings of fact
and conclusions of law were signed on February 7, 2000, and amended findings of fact,
conclusions of law and an amended decree of divorce were signed on November 17,
2000. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on December 7, 2000.
FACTS
The following factual presentation represents a marshalling of the evidence presented
by Appellant and Appellee at the trial court level.
(For ease of reference, the Petitioner/Appellant will be referenced throughout the
remainder of this brief as "Ken" and Respondent/Appellee as "Debora". References to the
3

pleadings in the record on appeal are by the letter "R" followed by the arabic number placed
on the pleading during the pagination process. In some cases, the letter "P" is used to
indicate the paragraph number of the document. References to the trial transcript are
identified by the letters Tp followed by the page number of the transcript. Exhibits are
referred to by the exhibit number. Other major documents are in the Addendum.)
1. During their marriage, the parties lived at 18185 West 1540 North, Fairfield,
Utah which comprised a home on one acre and 40 adjacent unimproved acres of pasture
land, some irrigated and some unirrigated, and twenty-five shares of water stock
purchased with the land, all hereinafter referred to as the "Property". R. 11 P 6
2. The Property was awarded to Debora in her previous divorce. See Exhibit
10 P 7.
3. In that divorce action, Civil No. 914400172, one of the Judges of the Fourth
Judicial District Court found that
A. at July 22, 1992, the Property had an $80,000 value, see Exhibit 10 P 6,
and
B. the Property was encumbered by a $44,353 debt owed to Earl and Gayle
Crossman, evidenced by a trust deed note dated November 22, 1985, signed by Debora
and her former husband, Vernaar J. Wilson. See Exhibit 11.
4. The Property was awarded to Debora, subject to the indebtedness owed to
Crossmans, leaving her an equity at July 22, 1992, of $35,646.77. See Exhibit 10 P 6.
4

5. The trust deed held by the Crossmans covered the Property i.e. the home, the
one acre, the forty acres of irrigated and unirrigated pasture and the twenty-five shares of
water stock. See Exhibit 11.
6. The debt to the Crossmans was due in March of 1993, eight months after Ken
and Debora were married. See Exhibit 11.
7. Ken had no legal obligation to the Crossmans. See Exhibit 11.
8. As a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, Ken had the right to obtain one V.A.
loan. Tp. 50 line 18.
9.

Debora could not apply for a loan from First Security Bank until she had

worked there for one year. Tp. 57 line 7.
10. Debora knew that First Security Bank would not loan money on raw land. Tp.
60 line 3.
11. On March 11, 1993, Ken obtained a $52,852 V.A. loan through First Security
Bank. See Exhibit 12.
12. Both Ken and Debora signed the V.A. loan. See Exhibit 12.
13. The loan proceeds were used to pay Debora's debt to the Crossmans and make
improvements to the home in which the parties resided during their marriage. Tp. 68
line 2.
14. Ken testified that at no time prior to obtaining the V.A. loan to pay Crossmans
and make improvements to the house did the parties
5

A. discuss dividing the Property. Tp. 45.
B. discuss that all Ken would receive was an interest in the house and 1
acre. Tp. 45.
15. Ken testified that he would not have utilized his VA entitlement if he had been
told by Debora that all he would receive was an interest in the house and 1 acre. Tp. 45.
16. Debora testified that prior to obtaining the V.A. loan to pay Crossmans and
make repairs to the house
A. she did not deed an interest in the 40 acres to Ken. Tp 60 line 19.
B. Ken knew exactly how Debora felt about it. Tp 60 line 19.
17. There exists no written agreement between the parties wherein Ken agreed to
obtain a VA loan in exchange for a one half interest in only the home and one acre and
not in the adjacent forty acres.
18. Monthly payments on the V.A. loan were made by Ken and Debora from their
joint earnings during the marriage and, since their separation in September of 1998, each
paid one half of the monthly payment as ordered by the court in the temporary mutual
restraining order and order on order to show cause dated November 2, 1998.
19. At the time of trial,
A. the balance owed under the V.A. loan, sold by First Security Bank to
Countrywide Funding, was approximately $44,500
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B. the house and one acre had a fair market value of $111,000, see Exhibits
7 and 8, and
C. the vacant acreage had a fair market value of $157,600. See Exhibit 9.
20. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement and
on December 20, 1999, issued a memorandum decision in which, among other things, the
court ruled that the home and one acre comprised a marital asset but that the adjacent forty
acre parcel was not a marital asset and awarded the same to Debora as her sole and separate
property.
21. After the court issued its memorandum decision and prior to the entry of the
decree of divorce, Ken filed a motion for reconsideration.
22. By its February 7, 2000 ruling, the trial court denied Ken's motion.
23. Pursuant to the court's memorandum decision and its ruling on Ken's motion for
reconsideration, amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and an amended decree of
divorce were entered on November 17, 2000.
24 Ken filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2000.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. There is no evidence that Ken understood that the 40 acres of
undeveloped land would not be part of the marital estate.
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In its amended findings of fact at paragraph 16, the trial court found that at the
time of the signing of the V.A. loan documents, the parties discussed the remaining 40
acres with Debora stating that such was to remain her separate property.
A close examination of the evidence clearly shows that there is nothing to support
this finding and, therefore, that it is clearly erroneous.
There is no written document stating that at the time he took out the V.A. loan,
Ken understood that the 40 acres of undeveloped land would not be part of the marital
estate.
The only evidence presented on this point was the testimony of the parties:
Debora testified at Tp. 60, as follows:
Q

But at any time did you ever deed him any interest in what we referred to as
the acreage or the raw-

A

No. He knew exactly how I felt about it.

Ken testified at Tp. 45, as follows:
Q

Was there ever a discussion between you and Debbie prior to the time that
you signed on that $52,000 loan of dividing up that property?

A.

No.

Q

Was there ever a discussion between the two of you where she said if you
take out a $52,000 loan with me to pay off this obligation the only thing you
will get out of it is a deed to the house and the one acre?
8

A.

No.

Q

If she had told you that, would you have signed on the $52,000 loan?

A

Most definitely not.

The foregoing testimony gives no support whatsoever to the finding of the trial
court that the 40 acres was to remain the sole property of Debora and did not become part
of the marital estate.
POINT 2. All property awarded to Debora in her previous marriage became
marital property during her marriage to Ken when he utilized his V.A. entitlement to pay
for it.
One question presented by this case is whether or not all of the real property
awarded to the Debora in her previous marriage became marital property during her
marriage to Ken.
A similar situation existed in the case of Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d
931 (Utah 1982). Shortly after the parties were married, they sold the wife's home in
Heber City and with the proceeds, purchased the Park City home from the husband's
mother by paying her $1,500 and paying die State of Utah $4,500 to extinguish its lien on
the property. Based upon these facts, the trial court awarded the wife one half interest in
the parties' Park City home and the husband appealed. The Utah Supreme Court upheld
the award to the wife by stating, at page 933

9

Assuming arguendo that the property was validly conveyed to the
husband prior to the marriage, it does not follow that it must be awarded
solely to him in a property settlement, especially where the wife has used
her separate resources to purchase the property from the husband's mother
and to clear pending liens.
To further support the award, the high court quoted its ruling in Jackson v.
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340, l(Utah 1980), which states that
The state of title to marital property prior to a divorce decree is not
necessarily binding on the trial court in its distribution of such property
pursuant to such decree. The trial court is empowered to make such
distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as
are necessary to that end.
These cases support an award of one half of the Property to Ken on the basis that
he used his separate resources to pay the $44,353 debt to Mr. Crossman i.e. he took out a
V.A. loan and made payments on said loan for 7 years and 8 months.
POINT 3

Equity demands that the Property was part of the marital estate.

Ken understands that under the Utah Supreme Court case of Turner v. Turner, 649
P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982), an appellate court may weigh the evidence and substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court in divorce actions but it will not do so lightly and
merely because its judgment differs from that of the trial judge. A trial court's
apportionment of marital property will not be disturbed unless there has been manifest
injustice or inequity showing a clear abuse of discretion.
Ken urges that the facts of this case clearly show injustice and inequity by the
court's determination that the 40 acre parcel was not part of the marital estate. Most
10

persuasive is the fact that but for Ken utilizing his V.A. entitlement, Debora would have
lost the Property which was the only asset she received from her first marriage. In as
much as the trust deed held by the Crossmens was secured by all of the Property not just a
portion thereof, it was unfair and unjust for the trial court to determine that Ken's V.A.
loan purchased the entire Property but only a portion thereof became part of the marital
estate.
Of equal importance is an analysis of the math at the time Ken borrowed money to
pay Debora's debt:
Scenario I
Prior to paying the Crossmens, there was no marital estate equity.
Value of the Property
Debt to the Crossmens
Debora's equity
Marital estate equity

$80,000
44,353
35,647
-0-

Scenario II
After the Crossmens were paid, there was no marital estate equity.
Value of Property
V.A. Loan
Debora's equity
Marital estate equity

$80,000
52,852
35,647
< 1,501 >
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Ken obligated himself to pay a $52,852 loan and in return believed he was entitled
to a one-half interest in the Property. What he did to help Debora was in the context of a
husband and wife relationship; it was not an arms length business deal.
The facts of this case clearly show that the trial court's ruling worked such
manifest injustice or inequity to Ken as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ken urges
A. that the trial court's ruling be reversed,
B. that he be awarded one half of the Property after recognizing Debora's
$35,644.77 premarital interest, and
C. that he be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.
Respectfully submitted,
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this &
day of July 2001, he mailed
two true and correct copies of the foregoing brief, postage pre-paid, to:
Donald W. Winters
Attorney at Law
375 East 790 South
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
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ADDENDUM

14

fourth Judicial District C^urt

Thcr as R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Atto- ney for Petitioner
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City. UT 84102
Telephone: (801)533-0525

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH M.HALL.

)
Petitioner,

AMENDED DECREE OF
DIVORCE

]

V.

DEBORA HALL,
Respondent.

1

Civil No. 984402025

)1

Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Having previously entered its decree of divorce herein without considering the timely
objection filed by Petitioner, now, pursuant to the motion of Petitioner for the entry of an
amended decree of divorce and good cause appearing, the court based upon its amended findings
of fact and amended conclusions of law now makes and enters the following amended decree of
divorce:
1.

The Petitioner and Respondent are herewith awarded a Divorce each from the other,

the same to become final upon March 7, 2000.
2.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

3.

Both parties are awarded the vehicles currently in their possession and each shall
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separately assume the debt thereon and hold the other harmless therefrom.
4.

The personal property of the parties shall remain as presently divided except that

Petitioner shall have the following:
a) tiller;
b) home on the range sheep camp;
c) lumber in the barn;
d) tractor and portable tack room and its contents.
5.

Petitioner is awarded $600 out of the remaining proceeds from the sale of two draft

mules and tack which occurred on November 2, 1998.
6.

Petitioner is awarded one-half of the equity in the marital home and the one acre of

land where it sits, this being the sum of $21,500.00
7.

Respondent is awarded the use and possession of the home and is ordered to pay

Petitioner his equity within six months from the date of execution hereof. Interest shall accrue
on Petitioner's herein awarded equity at the legal rate of 7.670 % commencing on the date of
execution hereof.
8.

Each party is to pay their own attorneys fees.

*

*
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DATED this

1/

day of November, 2000.

QWGMAL

Anthony W^fchogeld,.Fourth DistrJgtCoT" "

Approved as to form:

Donala W. Winters
Attorney for Respondent

//tr

Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369)
Attorney for Petitioner
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)

KENNETH M. HALL,
Petitioner,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

V.

>

DEBORA HALL,

Respondent. )>

Civil No. 984402025
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, now, pursuant to
the motion of Petitioner for die entry of amended findings of fact and conclusions of law and
good cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following amended findings of fact
and conclusions of law:
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife having married on July 23, 1992.

2.

The marriage was childless and the parties separated during September of 1998, and

have lived apart since that time.

•^

.
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3.

Respondent was previously divorced on July 22, 1992.

4.

In Respondent's previous divorce she was awarded certain real property consisting

of one parcel of approximately 40 acres of vacant ground and one parcel consisting of a house
and approximately one acre of ground, together with 24 shares of water.
5.

At the time of the marriage of these parties both parcels of Respondent's real estate

were encumbered by a debt still owing to the sellers thereof, Earl and Gayle Crossman, in the
amount of $44,353.23.
6.

At the time of the purchase, Respondent and her then husband paid a $40,000.00

down payment to the Crossmans against the full purchase price of $90,000.00
7.

At the time of the marriage of the parties to the present action, the vacant ground and

the parcel with the house was worth approximately $80,000.00 with Respondent's equity therein
being $35,646.77.
8.

On March 11, 1993, Petitioner obtained a $52,852 VA loan through First Security

9.

Both Petitioner and Respondent signed the VA loan.

Bank.

10. The loan proceeds were used to pay Respondent's debt to Mr. and Mrs Crossman
and make improvements to the house in which Petitioner and Respondent resided during their
marriage.
11.

Petitioner's income was utilized during the marriage to make the monthly payments

on the VA loan.

•:.j
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12.

By a temporary order dated November 2, 1998, each party was ordered to pay one

half of the monthly payment on the VA loan.
13.

On March 11, 1993, in preparation for taking out a loan to pay off the party from

whom she and her former husband originally purchased the real estate, the Respondent executed
a Quitclaim Deed whereby she converted the house and acre into marital property of this
marriage by naming Petitioner as a Joint Tenant with her on said property.
14.

Nearly concurrently with the execution of the foregoing Quitclaim Deed, the

parties obtained a loan in the amount of $52,852.00 from First Security Bank using the house and
one acre as collateral together with the Petitioner's VA entitlement.
15.

After this loan, the equity remaining in the house and one acre was approximately

$32,000.00, of which one-half then belonged to each party as their share of what had then
become marital property.
16.

At the time of the execution of the Quitclaim Deed and the signing of the loan

documents, the parties discussed the remaining 40 acres with Respondent stating that such was to
remain her separate property.
17.

Petitioner participated in the securing of the loan and the use of his VA entitlement

knowing his consideration therefore was an interest in the house and one acre.
18.

The proceeds of the loan were primarily used to make final payment to the

Crossmans.

12d

19.

During the marriage, the Respondent consistently declined to convert the vacant

acreage into a marital asset of the marriage.
20.

Subsequently these parties took out a line of credit loan which currently has a

balance of approximately $19,000.00 (Bank One loan.)
21.

The proceeds of the Bank One loan were used in part to effect repairs and for

remodeling on the house and in part to pay bills of the parties and to acquire further marital
assets.
22.

The house and one acre presently has a fair market value of $ 1 1 1,000.00

23.

The vacant acreage presently has a fair market value of $ 157,600.00.

24.

The personal property of the parties has already been physically divided, with the

exception that the tiller, home on the range sheep camp, lumber in the barn, tractor and portable
tack room and its contents should be awarded to Petitioner in as much as these items were
purchased by him either in trade for property he owned before he married Respondent or from
the proceeds of the sale of the Lehi property he owned prior to his marriage to Respondent.
25.

After the above items have been restored to Petitioner, the value of the personal

property taken by the Petitioner, including livestock, will be equal to the value of the personal
property retained by the Respondent.
26.

Existing debt against the house and one acre, including the Bank One Loan is

$68,000.00
27.

Equity to be divided in the house and one acre is $43,000.00.
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28.

Respondent should be awarded use and possession of the home subject to the

payment of Petitioners^ equity.
From the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that it has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the

issues and parties in this action.
2.

Each party is entitled to a divorce from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable

differences.
3.

Neither party is entitled to receive alimony form the other.

4.

Both parties shall keep the vehicle currently in their possession and assume the debt

thereon and hold the other party harmless.
5.

Personal property shall be divided as set forth above in the findings.

6.

The property which consists of the house and the one acre is a marital asset.

7.

Petitioner should be awarded judgment in the amount of one-half the equity in the

parcel of marital property being, $21,500. Respondent is awarded the use and possession of the
home, she should take steps to obtain the necessary financing to satisfy Petitioner's equity in the
property within six (6) months of the signing of the final Order and Judgment
8.

The $ 1,200.00 on deposit in Respondent's attorney's trust account should be divided

equally between the parties.
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9.

Each party should be ordered to assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs

incurred in connection with this action.
DATED this

JO
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Approved as to form:

;onvakt W. Winters
Attorney for Respondent

CD

- ^ U ,

*X» •"*<• -w C

123

30-3-4

HUSBAND AND WIFE

is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may
order a party to provide money during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or in the final order or judgment.
1993
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court.
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to the court. The court may waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4, Repealed.

1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;

10

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision,
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under
this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living that existed at
the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living.
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TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this

.?2odday of

tfoystf»rJ:>

..., i&&5.- ^

between . . . V ™ ^ . . J. v .)![IL^..ard. . PEBBIE G. I f l L ^ ^ j M S ^ ^

... (V
as TRUSTOR,

who- addrea. ia JJU&Z...

Jt/j^JSW

f

b

^

VAJLJ^.JITy..0f).

« TRUSTEE,* and

f

yEj&jr._CRQSS^

.QP5£M^,_t^ir..^

t

„ EiEN^PICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in
County, State of Utah:

.litnll

..

As per Exhibit "A", attached hereto and by reference herein made a part hereof.

Together with 25 shares Primary Water Fairfio.J Irrigation Co. and Well rights
under Usev's Claim *5-220-U4 CA (UGWC #54-220)

Together with ill buildings, fixtures and improvements th* eon and all water righu, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 2
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with saio property, or any part thereoi, w
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafbi siv-m to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OP SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, ia the principal *um of $. 5CL,.QQQ..GQ.
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as I
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such sdditional loan* or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a pionweory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of sllfsume
tiyeftifr^ or. a m s c e d by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as hecefe. provided.
: *» a ma**** «T the Utafe State Bar; a teak, buOdiaf aad faea ataabatioe or atrial*
IhoriajK*. to 4a a^faMSJmsc in Uu*»; • corso«*te iettlhoristd to da s trot bmnmm in
am 7 a t k s ^ T 3 a ^ y a«taoris«d to eo a W l w i k a a i in Utek
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PARCEL 1:
B^glcnipg at a point in a fence line on the South aide of * County
road South 425.91 feet and Heat 725*54 feet froa the north quarter corner of
Section 32, T--araeaip 3 Kouth, lance 2 Went, Salt Lake Bene and Meridian; thence
South 0*03*30** Ut%
22&*«S2 feet to the quarter section line froa which the
center of ?r.: :i?n 32 ? T>wnship 6 South, Range 2 Vest bears Seat 726.00 feet;
thence weci $V^0Q fiat; thence Horth 0*03'30" Vent along a lln* parallel vita
th<* North-ScutU quarcer-eectlon line 1837.38 feet to a point in a fence on the
Southeasterly
side of e State Highway;
thence along the fence on the
Southeasterly tide of said highway, along the arc of a 2900 foot radius curve to
the Left 499.77 feet the long chord of which bears Horth 34*29*30" Eaat 499.15
feet to a fence corner on the South side of a County road; thence South 89*13'
Seat 310*97 feet along the fence on the South line of the County road to
the
point of beginning.
TOGETHER WITH and subject to a right-of-way eaaeaent 6 feet wide on the Eaat side
the Northerly 700 feet of said property am sex forth in a right-of-way
aent recorded on February 13, 1975 aa Entry No. 2281 in Sook 1404 at Page
649» records of Utah County, Utah.

\jrfU!L

PARCEL 2:
Lot 2, Block 9, Fairfield Survey of Building Lots, according to the
official plat thereof on file in the office of the Utah County Recorder.

f

y

ft/y
#* *

PARCEL 3:
according
Recorier.

All of Lots 7, 8, 9, Block 4, Fairfield Survey of Building Lots,
to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the Utah County
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DEBORA G. WILSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
0

VERNAAR J. WILSON,

Civil No. 91440172

Defendant.

Judge
—ooOoo—

The above-entitled matter came on for evidentiary hearing before the Court
Commissioner on June 22, 1992. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, David
McPhie, and the defendant was present and represented by counsel, Gary Howe.
A Stipulated Pre-Trial Order was entered into and filed with the court on February
3, 1992, whereas the parties stipulated on the issued of child custody, visitation, and child
support. The parties further stipulated that the disputed issues reserved for trial would be
property division, debt payment, alimony, and attorney fee's.
The court, having heard the evidence adduced by the parties through proffer and
direct testimony in support of their respective positions, took the matter under advisement.
The court having reviewed the above documentation and upon being advised in
1

earned and contributed to the marriage during those years.
Defendant admitted that he realized advantages from his self-employment in the business
known as The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc., that is co-owned by defendant and his father, and
which allowed him to benefit from income that was not reported through the business, such as
a family vacation that was written off as a business expense, vehicles, gas, and insurance
coverage which were paid for by the business and used almost exclusively for family purposes,
and cash payments from customers that went unreported for tax purposes. Thus, the court finds
that substantial benefits were derived from defendant's business ownership and self-employment
that enabled defendant to shelter some of his income from tax liability and that these benefits
were used to directly subsidize the marriage. Therefore, the court finds that during the course
of the marriage the parties derived additional income in the amount of approximately $10,000
to $15,000 per year from The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. Therefore, the court shall find that
defendant's income for purposes of determining alimony and attorneys fee's is $45,000 per year.
6.

With regard to the valuation of the marital home, plaintiff alleges that the home

which is located at 18185 West 1540 North, Fairfield, Utah, on an one acre parcel is worth
approximately $60,000, and that the adjacent forty (40) acre parcel is valued at approximately
$400 per acre for the "dry" land $1,000 per acre for the land which has access to irrigation
water and is currently used as pasture. Plaintiff further testified that outbuildings on the
property could be valued at $2,000.
Defendant alleges that the home located on the one acre parcel is worth approximately
$65,000 and that the marital home along with the additional acreage can be valued at
approximately $90,000.

3

The court recognizes that the parties' real property is unique in nature in that marital
home is a small family farm and acreage located in a rather remote small town. The court
acknowledges that the parties attempted to have an appraisal done and that the appraisal was not
completed before the trial date due to the difficulty the parties' appraiser encountered in making
adequate comparisons to similar properties and in evaluating a fair market price for such an'
unique piece of real property.
Therefore, after taking into account both parties' testimony as to the recent sale prices
and value of adjoining and nearby properties, the court finds that the real property comprised
of the marital home on a one acre parcel and the additional forty (40) acres of adjacent, irrigated
and un-irrigated pasture land should be valued at $80,000. According to testimony, the parties
currently owe $44,353.23 on the property, thus their equity would be $35,646.77. ($80,000
current market value - $44,353.23 balance owing = $35,646.77 equity.) Each party is awarded
an one-half (1/2) share of the equity in the marital home in the amount of $17,823.38. Plaintiff
is awarded the possession and use of the marital home and adjoining acreage and is ordered to
pay defendant his one-half share of the equity.
7.

With regard to defendant's ownership share of stock in The Iron Anvil or Double

U Inc., a business owned by defendant and his father, defendant alleges that he only owns 28%
of the stock and plaintiff alleges that defendant has always represented to her that defendant's
father and defendant own the business in a 60/40 split. The court will accept the figure of
$33,004.00 as the value of stock owned by defendant in Double U Inc. See plaintiffs exhibit
No. 12 Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to one-half (1/2) of defendant's share of Double U Inc.
stock in the amount of $16,502. ($33,004 x 50% = $16,502.00).
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The plaintiff may offset her share of the Double U Inc. stock in the amount of $16,502
against defendant's share in equity of the marital home in the amount of $17,823.38. Therefore,
plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant $1,321.38 for the balance of defendant's interest in the
parties' equity in the home and defendant is ordered to release his interest in the home upon
receipt of payment from plaintiff.
8.

With regard to the division of other personal property accumulated by the parties

during the court of their marriage, the court orders defendant to return to plaintiff her wedding
and engagement rings and the vise he took from the barn. Further, defendant is ordered to sign
over to plaintiff the title to the horse trailer currently in her possession.
All other remaining personal property, including household furnishings, farm equipment,
and farm animals such as the horses, dogs, and goats shall be awarded to each of the parties as
they have heretofore divided it, with the exception that defendant shall be allowed to retrieve
the negatives of family photographs.
9.

With regard to the marital debts, defendant alleges that the parties borrowed

$17,000 from the Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. in order to purchase a duplex from the buyers
of the parties' Bluffdale home and the such purchase of the duplex was necessary to facilitate
the sale of the Bluffdale home. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should be held jointly responsible
for the $17,000 debt to The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc.
Plaintiff alleges that no contingency agreement existed with the purchasers of the
Bluffdale home and that the purchase of the duplex, which was subsequently foreclosed on, was
solely an investment property purchased by The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. for tax shelter
purposes.
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